Lynne Stewart: Casualty of the 'War on Terror'

In a decision that reflects the post-911 terrorism hysteria, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed prominent civil rights attorney Lynne Stewart’s convictions and remanded her case to district court Judge John G. Koeltl to reconsider her sentence. The appellate panel directed Koeltl to remand Stewart to custody and the 70-year-old woman is now in prison.

Stewart was convicted of conspiracy to provide and conceal material support to the conspiracy to murder persons in a foreign country (18 U.S.C. sec. 2339A and 18 U.S.C. sec. 2), conspiring to provide and conceal such support (18 U.S.C. sec. 371), and knowingly and willfully making false statements (18 U.S.C. sec. 1001). The majority opinion states that Stewart was convicted “principally with respect to [her] violations of those measures by which [she] had agreed to abide,” namely, Special Administrative Measures (SAMs).

The SAMs were placed on Stewart’s client, Sheikh Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, who is serving a life sentence for terrorism-related crimes. They restrict his ability to communicate with persons outside of the prison. Stewart and Abdel Rahman’s other attorneys, Ramsey Clark and Abdeen Jabara, signed statements saying they wouldn’t forward mail from Abdel Rahman to a third person or use their communications with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between him and third persons, including the media. Stewart violated her agreement to abide by the SAMs. Clark and Jabara allegedly did as well. Lawyers who violate SAMs expect to suffer administrative consequences, such as being denied visiting privileges. Yet Stewart was indicted for federal crimes. Clark and Jabara were not.

Judge Koeltl presided over the nine-month trial. Stewart was precluded from arguing that a prosecution for conspiring to commit a conspiracy (an inchoate offense) raises serious dangers. Koeltl sentenced Stewart to 28 months. The maximum sentence under the federal sentencing Guidelines is 30 years but the Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) that the guidelines are advisory, not mandatory.

Koeltl concluded that the terrorism enhancement, “while correct under the guidelines, would result in an unreasonable result.” He cited “the somewhat atypical nature of Stewart’s case” and “the lack of evidence that any victim was harmed as a result of the charged offense.” The result of the terrorism enhancement, according to Koeltl, was “dramatically unreasonable in [her] case” because it “overstate[d] the seriousness of [her] past conduct and the likelihood that [she would] repeat the offense.”

Stewart, Koeltl concluded, “has no criminal history and yet is placed in the highest criminal history category [under the terrorism enhancement] equal to that of repeat felony offenders for the most serious offenses including murder and drug trafficking.” Koeltl found that Stewart’s opportunity to repeat “the crimes to which she had been convicted will be nil” because she “will lose her license to practice law” [“itself a punishment”] and “will be forever separated from any contact with Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.”

Koeltl viewed Stewart’s personal characteristics as “extraordinary” and determined that they “argue[d] strongly in favor of a substantial downward variance” from the guidelines. He described her as a dedicated public servant who had, throughout her career, “represented the poor, the disadvantaged and the unpopular, often as a Court-appointed attorney,” thereby providing a “service not only to her clients but to the nation.”

Koeltl also considered that Stewart had suffered from cancer – undergoing surgery and radiation therapy – and found a significant chance of recurrence. At age 67, Koeltl observed, prison would be “particularly difficult” for Stewart.

Although the appellate majority stated that the district court judge is “in the best position to make an individual determination about the ‘history and characteristics’ of a particular defendant, and to adjust the individualized sentence accordingly,” the panel second-guessed Koeltl by ordering that he reconsider Stewart’s sentence. Specifically, the panel directed Koeltl to consider whether Stewart committed perjury at trial by testifying “that she understood that there was a bubble built into the SAMs whereby the attorneys could issue press releases containing Abdel Rahman’s statements as part of their representation of him.” The panel also directed Koeltl to consider Stewart’s possibly perjured testimony about “her purported lack of knowledge” of Taha, a leader of the Islamic Group, who had solicited a statement from Abdel Rahman opposing the continuation of a ceasefire between the Islamic Group and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s government.

In fact, Koeltl noted there was “evidence to indicate that [Stewart’s] statements were false statements.” But he concluded it was “unnecessary to reach [the question] whether the defendant knowingly gave false testimony with the intent to obstruct the proceedings” because (1) the Guidelines calculation already provided for the statutory maximum, and (2) a non-Guidelines sentence was, in Koeltl’s estimation, “reasonable and most consistent with the factors set forth in Section 3553(a).” Thus, Koeltl did consider whether Stewart committed perjury in his initial sentencing decision. Michael Tigar, Stewart’s trial counsel, told me he is “convinced that there is ample independent corroboration for Lynne’s version of events.”

Judge Calabresi, who joined the majority panel decision, noted in his separate opinion that Koeltl was “a judge of extraordinary ability [with] a well-earned reputation for exceptional judgment.” Calabresi wrote that “for us – who have not been involved in the case and do not know all the backs and forths, . . . to second guess the district court’s judgment seems to me be precisely what both the Supreme Court and our court sitting en banc . . . have said we should not do.”

According to Tigar, Koeltl’s sentence decision was “well-argued.” Tigar said, “For any court of appeals judge to write in a hostile vein about [Koeltl’s] decision is an arrogation to the appellate court of a power that the rules of procedure and long legal tradition vest in trial judges. In addition,” he added, “the sentence reflected the reality of this case, a reality that seems to have escaped the court of appeals panel.”

Calabresi thought it “not . . . entirely irrelevant” that Stewart was the only lawyer criminally charged even though two others also violated the SAMs. Noting that “while prosecutorial discretion may be salutary in a wide variety of cases,” Calabresi wrote, “when left entirely without any controls it will concentrate too much power in a single set of government actors, and they, moreover, may on occasion be subject to political pressure.” Calabresi observed that the district court’s exercise of its sentencing discretion “may provide the only effective way to control and diminish unjustified disparities.”

Judge Walker, concurring and dissenting, wrote separately that Stewart’s sentence was “breathtakingly low” and “extraordinarily lenient.” He would go further than the majority and vacate Stewart’s sentence as “substantively unreasonable.”

Both Calabresi and the majority thought it significant that all of the acts for which Stewart was convicted occurred before the September 11, 2001 attacks. Calabresi would “take judicial notice of their timing,” and “recognize that our attitudes about her conduct have inevitably been influenced by the tragedy of that day.” Notably, he added: “We must be careful then in judging Stewart based on lessons that we learned only after her – very serious – crimes were committed.” Stewart was indicted in 2002 and convicted in 2005.

“Lynne’s representation of the sheik was in the best traditions of advocacy,” Tigar said. “She was brought into the case by Ramsey Clark, and her actions on behalf of her client never went farther than Ramsey had already gone. The government’s conduct towards her when the SAMs issue first erupted validated that belief.”

The clear message of the 125-page majority appellate panel opinion is that attorneys who zealously represent their clients in the post-9/11 era beware. This result will undoubtedly chill the willingness of criminal defense attorneys to handle terrorism cases. Moreover, the Court of Appeals fortuitously released its opinion just as Attorney General Eric Holder announced his intent to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in federal court for his alleged role in the 9/11 attacks.

Read on >>

First They Came for Lynne Stewart

First they came for the communists, and I did not speak out--
because I was not a communist;
Then they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out--
because I was not a socialist;
Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out--
because I was not a trade unionist;
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out--
because I was not a Jew;
Then they came for me--
and there was no one left to speak out for me.
-Pastor Martin Niemöller, 1945

Now they're coming for the lawyers, and we must all speak out.

Last Thursday, after 13 days of deliberations, prominent New York civil rights attorney Lynne Stewart was convicted of conspiracy, providing material support to terrorists, and defrauding the United States government. Her 7-month trial was held in the same federal courthouse where the Rosenbergs were tried for conspiracy to commit espionage more than 50 years ago. Stewart faces between 35 and 45 years in prison.

Stewart was indicted in March 2002. The indictment was based on governmental monitoring of conversations between Stewart and her client, Shiek Omar Abdel Rahman, which occurred two and a half years before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Rahman is serving a life plus 65-year sentence for conspiring to bomb several New York City landmarks and soliciting crimes of violence against the U.S. military and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

Beginning in 1997, the Bureau of Prisons, at the direction of the Attorney General, imposed special administrative measures (SAMs) on Rahman, limiting his access to the mail, the media, the telephone and visitors.

Stewart was obliged to sign an affirmation agreeing to be bound by the SAMs, before being allowed to see her client. She agreed "only to be accompanied by translators for the purpose of communicating with inmate Abdel Rahman concerning legal matters" and not to "use my meetings, correspondence, or phone calls with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between third parties (including, but not limited to, the media) and Abdel Rahman."

The government charged that Stewart allowed the Arabic translator to read letters to Rahman regarding Islamic Group matters, and to conduct a discussion with Rahman regarding whether Islamic Group should continue to comply with a cease-fire in Egypt. It also alleged that Stewart concealed those discussions from prison guards, and announced to the media that Rahman had withdrawn his support for the cease-fire, in violation of the SAMs.

Stewart denied these allegations, and testified that she believed in good faith that relaying Rahman's statement calling for more consultation about the Egyptian cease-fire did not violate the SAMs. She said she was trying to have Rahman transferred to Egypt to serve his sentence by keeping him visible. Rahman is old, blind, does not speak English, and has been kept virtually incommunicado in a federal prison in Minnesota.

Her good-faith belief, Stewart tesfitied, was based on actions of former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, another of Rahman's attorneys. Clark also signed these SAMs, held press conferences, and conveyed Rahman's statements about Egyptian politics to the press. Yet, Clark was never prosecuted.

Clark, who testified for Stewart at her trial, told Amy Goodman of Democracy Now!, "I don't know of anything that Lynne did that I didn't do." He said, "This case would never have been brought except for the fear generated, and the advantage that the Bush administration was taking of it, by the events of September 11, 2001. In ordinary times and circumstances, it would be recognized that everything that Lynne did was exactly what an effective attorney representing a client zealously would be obligated to do."

At a 2002 conference, Stewart noted, "Usually if one breaks a Bureau of Prisons edict, one is told one can't visit the prison again, or one gets some sort of administrative slap on the wrist of some kind. One does not usually get indicted for aiding a terrorist organization."

Why did the government wait so long before indicting Lynne Stewart? According to Heidi Boghosian, executive director of the National Lawyers Guild, Stewart was a "prime target for the Attorney General, who needed desperately to show that the Justice Department was actively fighting terrorism."

When Stewart was indicted, John Ashcroft had arrested only one person since September 11 - John Walker Lindh. "By indicting Stewart," noted Boghosian, "Ashcroft effectively sent the dual message that he could indict other lawyers who represented clients with unpopular beliefs and that such clients do not deserve defense."

The same day Bush signed the USA Patriot Act into law, General Ashcroft announced an interim amendment to the Bureau of Prisons regulation, which took effect five days later, without the usual public comment period. It permits the Department of Justice (DOJ) unlimited and unreviewable discretion to eavesdrop on confidential attorney-client conversations of persons in custody, with no judicial oversight and no meaningful standards. It applies not only to convicted inmates, but to all persons in the custody of the DOJ, including pretrial detainees, material witnesses, and immigration detainees who have not been accused of any crime.

At a 2002 convention of the National Lawyers Guild, Stewart expressed alarm at what her indictment portends for the future of the attorney-client privilege and criminal defense. She said, "This is about protecting the right to defend. Once the attorney-client privilege is lost, there is no right to defend as we know it." Speaking about the government's monitoring of her conversations with her client, Stewart stated, "The question you should be asking is not what I was doing in that room, but what was the government doing in that room?"

During the McCarthy period of the 1950s, in an effort to eradicate the perceived threat of communism, the government engaged in widespread illegal surveillance to threaten and silence anyone who had an unorthodox political viewpoint. Many people were jailed, blacklisted and lost their jobs. Thousands of lives were shattered as the FBI engaged in "red-baiting."

Since September 11, those who question government policy have been, and will continue to be, branded "terrorist." Even though "terrorism" was not an element of any of the offenses with which Lynne Stewart was charged, and Osama bin Laden was not part of any of the charges, the prosecution was permitted to bring bin Laden's name into the trial.

A written threat from the Jewish Defense Organization was posted on the door to Stewart's home after 10 ½ days of jury deliberations in the trial. It referred to a message purporting "to reach out so the jurors understand what she is. And that's been done." The message gave Stewart's home address and said she "needs to be put out of business legally and effectively." It threatened to "drive her out of her home and out of the state." If this message did reach any jurors who were sitting on the fence, it may have pushed them over to the guilty side.

Stewart told Amy Goodman, "These SAMs said you know, 'If you break these regulations, you may be cut off from your client.' That was our greatest concern, that we would be cut off from the client. The idea of prosecution never entered our minds." Stewart continued, "I believe with my mind and heart that it was the right thing to do."

Lynne Stewart's indictment, and conviction, will also chill attorneys from taking on cases of unpopular clients. "The purpose of this prosecution," said Michael Ratner, president of the Center for Constitutional Rights, "was to send a message to lawyers who represent alleged terrorists that it's dangerous to do so."

Stewart's attorney, Michael Tigar, does not blame the jury for this injustice. "We have all in our lifetimes seen well-meaning juries get caught up in the media-dominated government rhetoric of their time, based mostly on fear," Tigar said after the verdicts were announced. "I do not criticize these jurors. I have every confidence this verdict will be set aside."

Lawyers representing Guantánamo detainees are being asked to sign agreements that their consultations with their clients will not be confidential. Tigar told Amy Goodman, "The only way that we will ever get to the bottom of the American concentration camp abuses at Gitmo and Abu Ghraib is if the lawyers for these prisoners are permitted to tell their stories to the world. If the government can shut off that communication, which they have attempted to do over and over and over again, these activities will continue in secret."

It is essential that people feel safe in these perilous times. But, as Supreme Court Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote in a 1995 opinion, "It cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis." The confidential relationship between attorney and client sits at the heart of our criminal justice system. We must zealously guard it or we will all be at risk.

Read on >>